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What Is Trauma to the Future?
On Glissant’s Poetics
john e. drabinski
How then to do things with tears?—Deliver us
Zion, from the mist. Kill us in the light.
Allen Grossman, “How to do things with tears”
In “The Formation of Intellectuals,” Antonio Gramsci writes:
It can be seen that the “organic” intellectuals which each new 
class creates with itself and elaborates in its own progressive de-
velopment are for the most part “specializations” of partial as-
pects of the primitive activity of the new social type which the 
new class has brought to light.1
The question of individual and collective identity is at stake in these 
remarks. Intellectual work, on Gramsci’s account, is both self-ar-
ticulation and collective transformation. That is to say, the func-
tion of the intellectual is both to articulate the un(der)articulated 
inner-life of a class and to begin with nearly nothing. The intellec-
tual, at least potentially, both transforms and creates the relation 
of subaltern classes to history—that is, to their muted history. This 
relation is always something new and so is a characteristic that dif-
ferentiates the transformative creator, the “organic intellectual,” 
from the bourgeois institution of “the thinker.” Whereas the insti-
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tution of the intellectual (professor, politician, labor organizer) re-
ifi es the given ideology of the ruling corporative class—buttressing 
what Althusser will later call ideological state apparatuses—the or-
ganic intellectual begins with another, perhaps “counter,” promise: 
the future.
This function of the organic intellectual turns, at least in part, 
on the bearing of an intelligible core upon the collective. The in-
tellectual brings that bearing to language. As the gathering point 
of that bearing, language clusters the myriad forces of social and 
economic class—the works and labors of those without an artic-
ulated history—to an emergent identity with a new or renewed 
sense of collectivity. Indeed, this is why Gramsci, in “The Modern 
Prince,” demarcates the difference between corporative and hege-
monic class in terms of the entrenchment of the former in history 
and the “moral and intellectual” transformation of the latter into 
the future.
In the following remarks, I would like to stage a confrontation 
between this account of the intellectual and the consequences of 
trauma for theory and theorizing. For trauma fundamentally alters 
the terms of the intellectual’s work, and so the conditions under 
which Gramsci’s organic intellectual labors must be reconceived. 
Only then can it be enacted in response to that wake within which 
shattered words are fi rst born: living after catastrophe. Whose 
trauma and what wake? As we shall see in what follows, the ques-
tion of specifi city must be central to any account of trauma and its 
relation to time. My concern here will be with the trauma of the 
Middle Passage and the wake that goes by the name Caribbean, 
engaging both in the work of Édouard Glissant. His work begins 
with the Présence Africaine collective, which put him in close con-
tact with the Negritude movement and its early detractors, includ-
ing Frantz Fanon. As a poet, novelist, and essayist, Glissant is near 
singularly dedicated to excavating the long shadow of the Middle 
Passage in contemporary Caribbean poetics, politics, and matters 
of New World identity. How is it that an identity can be—or even 
could have been—formed out of such a painful, traumatic past? 
What does the cultural work of the intellectual, rooted in the geog-
raphy of thinking (for Glissant, of course, Martinique and the West 
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Indies more broadly), produce in terms of a collective’s concern for 
a future? How is that future folded into the past?
With these questions, Glissant’s labors are situated precisely be-
tween these two forces: intellectual work as the formation of iden-
tity and the enigmatic situation of thinking after, and in the wake 
of, catastrophic trauma. And so we shall see how important it is 
to think the specifi city of trauma in the transformation of wounds 
into a future.
I.
The question of trauma has been central to various cultural, liter-
ary, and philosophical projects over the past decade-plus. Much, 
if not most, of that conversation is guided by two threads: the 
experience(s) of the Holocaust and the relation of trauma to the 
past. Thus, the problematics developed in this conversation typi-
cally concern issues gathered around the question of the represen-
tation of traumatic experiences in and of the Holocaust. Represen-
tation as memory, of course, concerns the relation of the present 
to the past—namely, how pastness can be and is made present. 
The experience of catastrophe introduces enigmas to representa-
tion—perhaps determining its failure—that have been well treated 
in both the memoir format and theoretical refl ection. What does 
it mean to relate to the unrepresentable? To the extent that this 
problem has registered in philosophy—typically under the rubric 
of mourning—the emphasis has almost exclusively been on the re-
lation of trauma to the past, that is, to the function and dysfunc-
tion of memory in relation to an immemorial.
For good reason. Trauma marks a wound in time. The wound 
to time is the consequence of catastrophic trauma’s destruction of 
the intelligible core that lies at or in the originary event of memory. 
I qualify the term trauma here with catastrophic to underscore the 
important difference between the putative traumatic birth of sub-
jectivity in, for example, Emmanuel Levinas’s and Jean-Luc Mari-
on’s work and the historically decisive (non)event of catastrophic 
loss. The impressional moment of catastrophe is rendered as a blow 
to the singular and collective psyche, rupturing whatever lived as 
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the border between memory and historiography, thereby marking 
with ashes, not words, the irreducible difference that remains be-
tween disaster and its memorialization.
But the economy of this irreducible difference, in the case of 
most literature on Holocaust trauma, has remained inextricably 
tied to history. The Holocaust, then, becomes that rupture in “his-
tory” (as such? or European?) that cannot be rendered or retrieved 
within conventional modes of narrative and didactic representa-
tion. What sense are we to make of this aesthetic crisis? Surely it 
is not only a question of rethinking aesthetic strategies (though it 
is certainly that). Gramsci’s work is instructive here, read along-
side Adorno’s remark that there can be no poetry after Auschwitz: 
what demands are placed on the intellectual after Auschwitz, after 
the catastrophic trauma that manifests the barbarism of culture 
and erased history’s moment for its victims and survivors? The 
intellectual is charged with so much: thinking in the ashes, think-
ing out of the ashes, thinking after the ashes. But it is always a 
thinking that attempts to render, even just as a failure of render-
ing, what has been and how it makes what preceded it impossible 
to think again. This, I believe, is the fullest sense of Adorno’s new 
categorical imperative, and one cannot separate intellectual work 
from life after the catastrophe, lived (in some sense) within that 
imperative.
Trauma, on this account, is as much about the living as it is 
about the dead. Indeed, it is about thinking the living and the dead 
at once, thinking within that mute space of intersection that we 
call both disaster and survival. He survives. She survives. They sur-
vive. We survive. In Celan’s disastrous turn of phrase, “the world is 
gone, I must carry you.”2 Catastrophic trauma folds victim, survi-
vor, witness, and witness to the witness into one and the same im-
perative: never the same poetry, never the same culture, never the 
same metaphysics, never the same theodicy, never this catastrophe, 
never any catastrophe, never again. And all of these gods must be 
transformed as we begin again. Trauma is about the dead, surely, 
but it is also for the living as a relation to the dead, as obligated to 
the dead with unbearable imperatives, and so always charged with 
the duties of beginning again with a new, renewed history.
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II.
Precisely because the question of trauma has, for the most part, 
been dominated by the European context, the primary concern has 
been with the relation of trauma to the past—the past as manifest 
in memory, and so the past’s problematic relation to the present. 
A partial exception to this trend, to use just one example, is Pe-
ter Novick’s work, culminating in his The Holocaust in American 
Life, which treats questions of trauma and memory through Mau-
rice Halbwachs’s notion of collective memory. But this still leaves 
futurity as futurity untreated; indeed, it is the mixture of the past 
with the concerns of the present (and so toward the future) that 
marks memory for Novick as an essentially political event. The 
sense of the future, on Novick’s rendering, is always one looped 
through the past and present, never beginning new in the wake of 
trauma as a devastation of memory. Rather, the future is always a 
strategic concern for Novick, a site within which struggles over the 
meaning of the past are negotiated, but never a question of creat-
ing after catastrophe. Negotiation and creation are not the same. 
Indeed, the meaning of catastrophe, of what it even means to re-
member disastrous loss, is the very thing Novick entwines with 
strategies concerning present issues and future tasks.
The Caribbean context alters the terms of this kind of relation 
to the past and future. To wit: discourse surrounding the Holo-
caust always marks the transformation of “our” relation to his-
tory. Thus Adorno articulates the “new categorical imperative,” 
that one ought to “arrange their thoughts and actions so that Aus-
chwitz will not repeat itself.”3 Benjamin’s reading of Klee’s angel 
of history in “Theses on the Philosophy of History” marks that 
same kind of transformation of a history, where one no longer sees 
the march of progress in “a chain of events,” but only “one single 
catastrophe which keeps piling wreckage upon wreckage and hurls 
it in front of his feet.”4 But where does the Caribbean face, and 
what faces him or her in that facing? Where is the wreckage of the 
Middle Passage? This question breaks the Caribbean question of 
trauma from that of the Holocaust, for piles of wreckage are still 
history, even if an impossible history. Where are the bodies of the 
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Middle Passage—the memorial sites of loss, however ruined—in 
that wreckage? These bodies are not mere fi gures; they are the very 
condition of memory and the possibility of folding memory into the 
future. The Middle Passage, no passage for the drowned. Drown-
ing is not ashes, water is not earth, and bodies disappear differently. 
These are two different materialities, and therefore two different 
fi gures of loss, which in turn marks an important difference in the 
senses of loss between Europe and the Americas. This difference 
alters what we mean by futurity, as well as the terms in which one 
might object to fantasies of the future. For Glissant, the Caribbean 
is futurity precisely because of the abyssal effect and affect of loss. 
Impossible history is not the loss of what was. It is, rather, what it 
means to begin without even the memory of having once possessed. 
The Middle Passage is just this much violence, and yet life goes on. 
At the shoreline, then on the plantation (which Glissant calls “one 
of the wombs of the world” in Poetics of Relation), the future is 
a kind of facticity, not a project. The name Caribbean is itself in-
separable from the openness of what is to come. The future, insofar 
as it can be taken up, offers less than nothing as wreckage within 
which a movement to the future can take root. This is the Carib-
bean context. “Roots,” Glissant writes, “make the commonality of 
errantry and exile, for in both instances roots are lacking. We must 
begin with that.”5 How roots are lacked and precisely what fi gures 
this sense of the loss of rootedness are decisive in thinking trauma, 
memory, and the future in the Caribbean context.
Where to begin?
Beginning is nothing other than orientation toward the future, 
though the grounds or nongrounds of that orientation are of ulti-
mate signifi cance. Intellectual work toward the future—this work 
is always some form of historiography. The act of creation in the 
Caribbean context is marked by history, no doubt, but in a differ-
ent manner. In Caribbean Discourse, Glissant writes that
The language of the Caribbean artist does not originate in the 
obsession with celebrating his inner self; this inner self is insepa-
rable from the future evolution of his community.
But what the artist expresses, reveals, and argues in his work, 
the people have not ceased to live in reality. The problem is that 
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this collective life has been constrained by the process of con-
sciousness. . . . That is why he is his own ethnologist, historian, 
linguist, painter of frescoes, architect.6
The Caribbean organic intellectual is his own—everything. His 
or her specialty is not a specialty at all; in contrast to Gramsci, 
Glissant’s intellectual does not attend to the specifi city of social 
class but rather to the entire crashing of impossible history on the 
shores of the New World. What does that make of beginnings? 
What kind of subjectivity begins at the shores of arrival, in the 
wake of a specifi c kind of less than loss that drowns, rather than 
burns, history?
A fi rst clue. Glissant affi rms (with all due caveats) the Deleuz-
ian notion of nomadic subjectivity in the opening pages of Poetics 
of Relation (1990)—an affi rmation continued across the 1990s in 
Introduction à une poétique du divers (1996) and up through Phi-
losophie de la relation (2009)—precisely because of this Caribbean 
context. This is to say, nomadic is not the qualifi er of subjectivity 
as the result of a critique of metaphysics, nor does it respond to 
various epistemological paradoxes. Glissant’s nomad has another 
materiality and therefore another genesis. Caribbean subjectivity is 
nomadic because of the very conditions in which Glissant fi nds Af-
ricans in the Americas, because of the work that needs to be done 
in the wake of this trauma, and so for reasons of where he begins 
as a thinker in the fullest, organic sense.
I want to get at this sense of the nomadic in Glissant by tracking 
his thought through three conceptual and fi gurative movements: 
birth, roots, and death. These three movements work across what 
Glissant calls, in his introduction to the “Riveted Blood” poems, 
a “tortured geography.”7 This tortured geography writes Glissant 
as much as he writes about it; in conceiving births and roots, one 
writes as the living without the place of the dead, in the geos of 
whatever remains, or, in this case, cannot remain of their bodies. 
One is written by one’s birth, moved to word by one’s roots, not 
just out of respect for the dead (though that is enough). Trauma is 
as much for the living as for the dead. Trauma is only trauma for 
those who survive and live from out of and within the disaster. In 
Caribbean Discourse, Glissant writes:
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The spoken narrative is not concerned with the dead. We stand 
our mouths open under the sun like bagasse, silenced from else-
where. We encumber our moons with ceremonies that lack fi re. 
. . . Purify the breath until it reveals the harsh taste of the land: 
bring breath to the death of rocks and landscape. (CD, 237)
Under the sun like bagasse, the fi brous remains of sugar cane 
drained of their juices, left in the sun without the resources of re-
plenishment: Again, this is a different kind of loss. This is the trau-
matic arrival of “us,” Glissant’s “us,” the Caribbean context. To 
write trauma, then, is to be written by it—thus, we are “us,” a 
collective in the accusative—and to return always to what remains 
after the draining and drowning, always with only a wholly gratu-
itous gesture of creation, silenced from elsewhere fi rst by the harsh 
taste of the land. Geos that does not nourish roots but underpins 
the bagasse and sets it in the sun without nourishment from the 
water, for water is fi rst just as bitter as the land: death without the 
body as wreckage or remainder. For Glissant, then, trauma is to 
be written beginning with the tortured a-geography (what cannot 
be mapped but is still landscape and place) of the ocean, from the 
absent rocks of departure and bitter sands of arrival, and with the 
salt in the earth, the water, the wound. Silenced from elsewhere. 
Breath brought to death.
The nomadic subject, this rhizome, writes as a response to tor-
tured geography. From the rhizomatic subject we can begin to un-
derstand how futurity is created in a posttopological logic captured 
in Glissant’s notions of the Imaginary and Relation. Here Glissant 
works in the confrontational space between Gramsci’s organic in-
tellectual and the demands of writing after disaster.
birthabyss
There can be no birth out of trauma without abyss. What does it 
mean to be born a subject, to be born into a collective-which-is-
not-one in the wake of the catastrophe that is the Middle Passage? 
Glissant’s account takes us back to the boat and the ocean, linked 
as they are to the conditions of this birth and saturated as they are 
with abyssal depths. From this, in this, and always with this, birth 
is terrifying. In Poetics of Relation, Glissant writes:
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What is terrifying partakes of the abyss, three times linked to the 
unknown. First, the time you fell into the belly of the boat. . . . 
the belly of the boat dissolves you, precipitates you into a non-
world from which you cry out. This boat is a womb, a womb 
abyss. . . . This boat is your womb, a matrix, and yet it expels 
you. This boat: pregnant with as many dead as living under sen-
tence of death.
The next abyss was the depths of the sea. Whenever a fl eet 
of ships gave chase to slave ships, it was easiest just to lighten 
the boat by throwing cargo overboard, weighing it down with 
balls and chains. These underwater signposts mark the course 
between the Gold Coast and the Leeward Islands . . . the entire 
ocean, the entire sea gently collapsing in the end into the plea-
sures of sand, make one vast beginning, but a beginning whose 
time is marked by these balls and chains gone green. (PR, 6)
This construction “womb abyss” is crucial for understanding the 
origins of the rhizomatic subject in the Caribbean context. It is 
worth recalling that Glissant calls the plantation, that fi rst site of 
creolization, “a belly of the world” (PR, 75). But here Glissant is 
naming the birthplace of the shoreline, that immediate arrival af-
ter the Middle Passage. At this shoreline, at the threshold of this 
womb-space, there is no sense of arrival in-world. Nonworld is 
not death. Therein lies both the trauma and the necessity. Terror 
marks this birth as traumatic with the vanishing of the intelligi-
ble—“linked to the unknown.” The fact that birth comes with as 
many dead as living marks this birth with loss before the subject is 
capable of possession, so we cannot call it a birth as loss. We are 
already absent the terms necessary for loss to occur. Here, again, 
the distance between Europe and the Americas is opened. The Eu-
ropean story of loss begins with possession and then undergoes 
the cindering of memory, whereas for Glissant arrival is fi rst phi-
losophy. Nothing precedes the shoreline. This is the fi rst threshold: 
from the boat’s belly to the shore. And then the plantation.
The womb of the boat’s belly gives way to the new time of birth 
in the New World, and so to the Caribbean proper. This new time 
and birth is the end of the sea at the sand, an end of the terror and 
the beginning of trauma for the living. The dead mark the time of 
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this birth, of the living and their sense of what it means to go on, 
but as a peculiar and utterly devastating absence: the balls and 
chains gone green. To repeat, water and fi re leave different senses 
of nothingness. For the Caribbean context, this is all the more less 
than loss, for the body does not remain as a haunting image, nor 
does it remain as a trace of itself in ashes. The ball and chain gone 
green. The metal that decays—this sense of ruin—is only the re-
mainder of what held bodies to the terrifying. Birth is marked with 
this time as an absence more absent than loss and its traces.
rootsabyss
Birth sets the human person. Sets in the sense of putting on a sur-
face that, however shifty, might sustain one’s weight. But the abys-
sal conditions of birth in this trauma cannot sustain. Indeed, the 
very conditions that defi ne survival in Holocaust literatures split 
history into before and after disaster, devastating memory and 
rootedness in the black hole that is trauma. Glissant starts from an-
other place. What remains is not a split in history, nor a black hole 
that stands between what was and what lives as ruins. The ruins of 
the Middle Passage are fi gured by Glissant as the deterioration of 
the ball and chain at the bottom of the ocean. But this is not a ves-
sel, however fractured and ruined, of birth. Rather, and decisively, 
it is the ruined remains of what held a body—fi guring, then, as 
millions of bodies—captive in the belly of the vessel and sank them 
into the sea’s abyss. A birth vessel that could never be one.
Bodies do not mark this traumatic birth, as they do for Benja-
min in “Theses on the Philosophy of History”; there are not bod-
ies—decaying or ashen—in the shackles. Only the shackles—gone 
green—remain. Drown at the sea’s bottom. Lost. Salt, as treated in 
the Black Salt cycle, sits in the wound of those who survive, but 
it is also what destroys what cannot remain, what cannot even be 
conceived as loss: the body of the slave thrown overboard. Roots 
set and fail to take up in what is less than the remainder. There 
are not even the privileges of loss, namely, the object of mourning. 
Indeed, loss itself is stolen in the Middle Passage. So roots do not 
cling even to traces. In the poem “Gorée,” a refl ection on the island 
off the coast of Senegal where slaves awaited vessels to the “New” 
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World, Glissant attempts to think back to this origin, but fi nds this 
movement strangled by absence.
He inhabited his cry treefull: his roots spilled into ravines 
shouting out.
He knotted into time’s gorge rawness from the deeps, and 
stayed many a wind-bare sail with his gaze.
He had no room to call upon surpassing, once steered be-
tween coast and bluff shore, in the harbor island where yester-
day’s dreams garrotte dreams of tomorrow to their death. (BS, 
117)
Strangulation of dreams, strangled by the iron clasp of transport—
this generates the specifi c absence of the Caribbean context. Fur-
ther, from Caribbean Discourse:
Off the coast of Senegal, Gorée, the island before the open 
sea, the fi rst step towards madness.
Then the sea, never seen from the depths of the ship’s hold, 
punctuated by drowned bodies that sowed in its depths explo-
sive seeds of absence. (CD, 9)
Memory of Gorée seals abyssal beginning by locating the move-
ment, not from Africa to the Americas, but from having already 
lost Africa and being conceived as a people in the boat’s belly. The 
seed of New World identity and identities. “Seeds of absence”—
the very phrase fails to make sense except as the failure of memory, 
not as a failure to recall, but a failure of any relation of recollec-
tion. In this failure, the peculiar sense of root is glimpsed. Roots 
that emerge toward (not from) the absence of the depths of the sea, 
depths that, as we saw above, do not even bear the remainder. So, 
the rhizomatic subject must be born unrooted in order to maintain 
any hope of creating on and in a tortured geography.
deathabyss
Trauma is as much for the living as for the dead, thinking both 
at once. Let us maintain our context: the living live by the seeds 
of their birth, an absence before loss, for the time of trauma is 
marked always by death. Death is here not the death of those who 
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suffer but of those whose voice is absented by both the terror of the 
unintelligible and the bodyless nonremainder of the ball and chain 
gone green. In a word, a voice absented by abyss. Abyss encases 
birth and replaces the soil that roots might seek or from which they 
might spring forth. The abyss of this death, then, is at once birth 
and root. And in this death-abyss, that which makes futurity pos-
sible emerges. From “Wounds” in Black Salt:
Lands. Roots gone silent. Africa and far from its name, islands
Abandoned in death agony, banished from the world, naked
With blood clogged by nights’ burden
Polynesia dying dark he sights you
And denies you come with burden and means you be fruitless
The way we see a rooster in the gold of old corn die
A bitter glittering death. (BS, 98)
This last line is crucial for understanding what, for Glissant, the 
trauma of the Middle Passage means to futurity. DeathAbyss is bit-
ter death, yes. But also a glittering death.
What does it mean that death glitters? Glissant, in a passage 
from Caribbean Discourse cited above, fi gured the subjectivity 
born of this trauma as the bagasse, the fi brous remains of sugar 
cane wrung dry—that is, living in the nonworld wake of an abyssal 
death. But death is also glittering. Mouths open to the sun, wrung 
dry of all that might nourish, yet still capable of refl ecting that sun, 
sparkling, decorating. This opens the time of catastrophic trauma 
back onto a possible future. DeathAbyss with a decorative sparkle. 
Historians falter; poets remain and have the future (Glissant’s nu-
anced reorientation of Aristotle’s Poetics). Glissant writes, again 
from Black Salt:
It was the salt in time’s bowl. Nothing was left but an obscure 
urn of words. Is there a morning? The darkness of course bodes 
well—when words are shining on the steps up to the house. In 
this realm of our hands. (BS, 107)
Salt in time’s bowl. The peculiar temporality of this trauma lies in 
the fi gure of salt in time’s bowl, the salt in the wound that makes 
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time catastrophic time. This fi gure recalls Primo Levi’s account 
of the temporality of the camps in Survival in Auschwitz. In that 
work Levi describes the temporality of the camps as the loss of any 
fold in time, any sense of sequentiality; in death-camp time, each 
moment lies distinct without relation to past or future. This is in 
no small part what prompts Levi to ask in that work: “is this a 
man?” Does the human remain without this fold of time? But that 
is time in the camp; the time of survival is altogether different. Se-
quentiality re-emerges in survival, however fractured. This is what 
it means for trauma to work for the living as much as the dead. 
What, then, are the folds in time for Glissant? Survival born of 
and unrooted in DeathAbyss folds differently, as it is without the 
distant shores of a burned history. There is instead this drowned 
history. There is no fold into the past, then, except to arrive at 
the depths of the sea where only rotting shackles lie as absence 
of memory. The beginning is where the ball and chain go green, 
but that undergoing does not fold over into an economy of vis-
ibility. At the sea’s bottom, memory is drowned, and the problem 
of making a future commences without even the terms of loss be-
ing rendered visible. Again, the distance between Europe and the 
Americas. So there is beginning, and so time folded into a future, 
but without the same fold—however ruptured—into the past. Glis-
sant’s survivor—the Caribbean itself, the tortured geos of sand and 
sea, the death-arrival-birth—is not Levi’s survivor for the very rea-
son that the sequentiality of time does not suffer a suspension and 
fracture. There is loss of loss, pure annihilation. And so it begins 
there, where the ball and chain go green, birthing to the shores 
where the DeathAbyss unroots, yet glitters still in its bitterness.
III.
The rhizome is generated by these conditions: the intersection and 
clinging of abyss to birth, root and the death that brings birth back 
to its glittering bitterness. The bitterness glitters; there is, in one 
sense or another, light. A glitter to and after what is drowned? How 
can this make sense? Simply put: life goes on, however marked it 
may be by the abyssal absence of birth and root and death. Life 
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goes on, so trauma is a beginning as much as it is an end. For the 
Caribbean situation, this beginning is the unrooted subject, the rhi-
zome, the nomad.
What does it mean, then, to think as nomad working from the 
bitter glittering death that is birth and root? Glissant’s “answer” 
is simple: the persistence of the Imaginary. By Imaginary, Glissant 
here means the ability to imagine, conceive, and know the world 
otherwise. This imaginary is organic in the sense of a connected-
ness to land and body, but this is always a sense of organicity read 
against itself; there is always the tortured geography and the salt in 
the wound. The Caribbean context—Caribbeanness (Antillanité)—
is therefore a method for Glissant, not a state of being. The forma-
tion of the Imaginary, creativity and its actualization in creation, 
works with the tools of BirthAbyss, RootAbyss, and DeathAbyss 
(my terms), but not in order to overcome them. Rather, they pro-
vide the posttopological map—indeed, a “map” rendering topol-
ogy impossible—deployed in response to that tortured geography 
that renders the world opaque. And always rich in its opaqueness, 
giving a bitter-yet-nourishing salt to the rhizome. This is organic 
intellectual work without the privileges of loss. It is, rather, intel-
lectual work of repetition without resolution, sustained contradic-
tion without neutralizing the right to obscurity. Glissant writes:
An “intellectual” effort, with its repetitive thrusts (repetition has 
a rhythm), its contradictory moments, its necessary imperfec-
tions, its demands for formulation (even a schematic one), very 
often obscured by its very purpose. For the attempt to approach 
a reality so often hidden from view cannot be organized in terms 
of a series of clarifi cations. We demand the right to obscurity. 
Through which our anxiety to have a full existence becomes part 
of the universal drama of cultural transformation: the creativity 
of marginalized peoples who today confront the ideal of trans-
parent universality. (CD, 2)
Transparency confronted with a different kind of intellectual, 
engaged with a very different sense of depth and soil than what 
engages Gramsci’s organic intellectual. Gramsci’s intellectual un-
derstands the hidden intelligibility, a certain kind of transparency 
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(at least as a regulative ideal), of his social class. Glissant’s nomad, 
beginning with the abyss, has depth as sea, soil as salted and tor-
tured. Thinking after trauma, toward the future, must confront 
transparency and universality, not because it is a remnant of an 
Old World order, hopelessly square or even quaint, but because of 
the conditions of thinking in the Caribbean context. There is no 
history or memory lost. That would be a privilege enabling recol-
lection with all of its regulative ideals—the way universality is so 
often smuggled in against obscurity. If there is rhizome, and its 
abysses are method, not a state of being to be clarifi ed or over-
come, then the future must be mapped and unmapped across a 
geos that puts salt in wounds. The future does not return to its 
losses to mourn. Rather, the future is created with gratuitous ges-
tures affi rming opacity.
Glissant calls this affi rmation of opacity Relation. The term is, 
of course, to be read against itself, for relation traditionally signi-
fi es either correlation or dialectic, both of which clarify, resolve, 
and fi x. But nomadic subjectivity works relation against itself, so 
Glissant will defi ne relation as detour, exile, and errantry. Relation, 
in other words, rejects fi liation in the aporetic name of “chaotic 
network.” What would fi liation mean, fi liation with a landscape 
initiated by genocide, then enslavement? Without fi liation, there is 
only the moment of creation, a creation whose encroachments are 
not of a gasping light—unlike, say, Celan—but of an abyss whose 
death shadow glitters. Returns are always detours, for Glissant, 
and so it is with the condition of the specifi c postcoloniality of the 
Caribbean, both as a state of arrival and a method.
A last word. Let us turn to the question of place. A tortured 
geography puts the nomad out of place with an act of violence 
to roots. So where is connection? How does place become some-
thing other than abandonment and a MemorialAbyss to impos-
sible suffering? Postnatural, abyssally born, place is nonfi lial and 
nomadically traversed, which is not to say it ceases to or cannot be. 
Rather, there is always the defi ning fragility. Thus, Glissant moves 
the rhizome from noun to verb: “Is this some community we rhi-
zomed into fragile connection to a place?” (PR, 206). The rhizome 
rhizomes—herein lies the simplicity of Glissant’s intellectual and 
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the fi at, ex nihilo character of creativity after trauma, toward the 
future. The rhizome’s rhizome is both an act of self-movement—
an abyss cannot propel—and that moment wherein the collective 
is at stake. The organic intellectual rhizomes after trauma, and 
that intellectual’s organicity always moves with abyssal shadows, 
unrooted.
It is worth noting here, in close, how profoundly signifi cant in-
tellectual work is for Glissant, as he rejects political action or vio-
lence as the decisive moment of identity formation (pace Fanon, of 
course). Indeed, this is why the political murder plotted by the eight 
Martinican protagonists in his novel The Ripening can barely be 
said to begin the formation of collective identity. Intellectual work 
is this beginning, as it forges fragile connections—nomads in collec-
tivity—that construct a “we” in poetry, architecture, painting—a 
new history in the nominative. And all of these (as well as other 
aesthetic adventures) are defi ned by their (at least possible) nonfi l-
ial, rhizomatic character, as well as a fi nitude that is never a loss, 
but always only another detour. This is surely not without anxiet-
ies. How then to do things with tears? Deliverance from the mist. 
Deliverance rhizomes. That is, nomads, for Glissant, become within 
a death moved from a bitter glittering to an abyssal glow with its 
own ghosts, its own ambivalent salt, its own, in a word, future.
Notes
1.  Antonio Gramsci, “The Formation of Intellectuals,” The Modern 
Prince and Other Essays, trans. Louis Marks (New York: Interna-
tional, 1992), 118.
2.  “Die Welt is fort, ich muß dich tragen”; Paul Celan, “Vast, Glowing 
Vault,” Poems of Paul Celan, trans. Michael Hamburger (New York: 
Persea, 1988), 267). Derrida has given this line much attention, but 
my invocation of it here should not be read as an allusion to Derrid-
ean motifs.
3.  Theodor Adorno, Negative Dialectics (New York: Continuum, 2000), 
365. See also his “Education after Auschwitz,” Can One Live after 
Auschwitz? trans. Henry W. Pickford (Stanford, CA: Stanford Uni-
versity Press, 2003), 19–33.
4.  Walter Benjamin, “Theses on the Philosophy of History,” in Illumina-
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tions, ed. Hannah Arendt, trans. Harry Zohn (New York: Schocken, 
1968), 257.
5.  Édouard Glissant, Poetics of Relation, trans. Betsy Wing (Ann Arbor: 
University of Michigan Press, 2000), 11. Hereafter cited as PR.
6.  Édouard Glissant, Caribbean Discourse, trans. J. Michael Dash 
(Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 1999), 236. Hereafter 
cited as CD.
7.  Édouard Glissant, Black Salt: Poems by Édouard Glissant, trans. Betsy 
Wing (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1998), 17. Hereafter 
cited as BS.
This content downloaded from 
             148.85.223.16 on Fri, 17 May 2019 00:28:22 UTC              
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
